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One of the most disturbing trends in developing countries in recent 
years has been the rapid growth in defense spending. While the decade 
1975-85 saw more than a 30 percent increase in defense spending in real 
terms, third world countries as a whole showed an even greater propensity 
to spend on armaments and security - a rise of over 50 percent in defense 
spending during the same period (Deger and West, 1987, p. 1). 
While the willingness of political leaders to pursue national objectives 
through military means is hardly unique to the third world, the military 
burdens of many less developing countries greatly exceed the levels even 
the most sympathetic observers would concede are adequate for national 
security needs. In fact there is increasing evidence (Mullins, 1987, ch. 2; 
McKinlay, 1989, chs. 1, 2) that the growth in military power and the 
willingness to employ it are not directly related to the state's economic 
performance or to the level of economic development. The net result of 
these trends is that some of the world's poorest nations, as measured in 
terms of Gross National Product (GNP), are among the most heavily armed. 
While the real resources devoted to national defense by developing 
countries has more than doubled over the last decade, there has been very 
little investigation by development analysts of the causes of this phenomenon. 
The decisions with respect to military expendit6res and arms imports are generally 
viewed as being governed by exogenous factors, outside the considerations bearing 
on allocation of public resources for development and civilian government services, 
and presented as a kind of budgetary Robson's choice (Deger and West, 1987, 
p. XXI). 
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Recently, however, the magnitude of budgetary allocations to national 
defense and the austerity imposed by severe constraints on the resources 
available to third world governments have stimulated a new interest in 
accounting for the purposes and consequences of military expenditures. 
There is, however, little evidence of a consensus with respect to the appropriate 
weighing of factors in an explanation of the allocation of resources to national 
defense or in a generally-applicable model of the interaction between security and 
economic performance (Deger and West, 1987, p. XX!). 
Even at the conceptual level, economic theory does not provide any 
clear prediction of how the net impact of an increase in the military burden 
would influence growth, development, or welfare (Taylor, 1981, p. 1). 
Classical theory, for example, would predict on the basis of resource 
allocation that increases in defense will decrease investment and/or civilian 
consumption and thus reduce growth or welfare. 
Keynesian theory, on the other hand, implies that in the presence of 
inadequate effective demand the operation of the income multiplier would 
imply an increase in national product, resulting from increased expenditures. 
More specifically, Keynesians generally assume, at least in the case of the 
developed countries, that in situations of excess capacity, operating with 
substantial excess capacity, additional demand and output from expanded 
military expenditure will increase capacity utilization, thereby increasing 
the rate of profit and possibly accelerating investment (Treddenick, 1985, 
79:80). Clearly, whether Classical or Keynesian effects predominate will 
determine the net impact of defense expenditures on growth (Deger and 
Smith, 1985, p. 15; Deger, 1986, ch. 4). 
Because of the concentration of defense plants in the developed coun-
tries, most economists have tacitly assumed that if Keynesian defense re-
lated effects are operative, their impacts would be most likely felt in these 
economies. The developing countries, being more supply constrained and 
generally lacking indigenous defense industries, would be more logical places 
to find the Classical mechanisms operative (Looney, 1989c). 
Perhaps for these reasons, Marxists have. also focused their analysis of 
the causes and consequences of military expenditures largely on the ad-
vanced countries. 
At least for the United StateS', recent empirical studies have not sup-
ported the Marxian interpretation of defense expenditures (Looney and 
Mehay, 1989). In addition, Marxists have had a hard time countering the 
argument why, given the relatively capital intensive nature of defense indus-
tries, the rate of return on these activities has not fallen over time. One 
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way to get around this apparent contradiction in Marxist analysis is to 
assume that capitalist governn1ents purchase armaments at negotiated prices. 
They tax civilian incomes and profit and redistribute the revenue in such a 
manner that the favored military producers receive a disproportionately 
higher return on their investment. 
While some evidence supporting this proposition has been found in the 
third world, particularly in military regimes (Looney, 1989b), some concep-
tual problems still exist. 
Still, such government intervention cannot overcome the decline in the average 
rate of profit. Rather than buttressing modern capitalism as contemporary Marxist 
economists would have it, military production hastens the fall in the rate of profit, 
and therefore, can serve only to identify the internal contradictions Marx had 
forecast (Looney, 1989b). 
Probably because of the lack of a consistent theory of defense expenditures ap-
plicable to all countries, the major examinations to date on possible defense-
growth relationships in the third world have been for the most part undertaken 
with resort to a theoretical empirically based macroeconomics (Deger and West, 
1987, p. 10). 
Because the results of this analysis have tended to vary with sample 
size and period covered, few definitive conclusions as to the net impact of 
increased allocations to defense can be made. For example, several ·studies 
have indicated negative effects are likely, while others have found positive 
associations (Chan, 1985, 1987). Since there is so little theoretical analysis 
underlying this work, it is impossible to choose between competing inter-
pretations of the impacts likely to be associated with third world military 
expenditures. 
The purpose of this paper is to merge several elements in the Classical, 
Keynesian and Marxist approaches to the analysis of third world military 
expenditures. The aim is to develop an empirically testable post-keynesian 
framework. Hopefully, this approach will be capable of providing insights 
not only as to the likely economic impacts associated with third world 
military expenditures, but, perhaps what is more important, a partial 
understanding of the motivations underlying these expenditures . 
• 
A Post Keynesian Framework 
One of the major attractions of the post-keynesian approach to the 
analysis of the ramifications of third world military expenditures is that it 
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provides an explanation of economic growth and income distribution (Loo-
ney, 1989d) - with the two viewed as being directly linked to one another 
(Eichner, 1978; Cornwall, 1978). The key determinant to both is in-
vestment, whether measured against total national income or viewed as the 
percentage change over time. 
In this regard higher military spending may have significant multiplier 
effects, particularly if concentrated on the acquisition of domestic equipment 
and supplies. It is also possible with excess industrial capacity, that positive 
industrial linkages to the non-military private sector exist. It follows that 
the demand generation emanating from the military may, through increased 
capacity utilization, expand output and thus increase the rate of return 
on capital, investment, and possibly increase growth (Deger and Smith, 
1985, p. 50). 
If this assessment is correct, we need to distinguish between the first 
order and second order effects of military spending. The immediate direct 
impact of a rise in military spending is likely to be higher demand, produc-
tion, and employment. These favorable effects, however, may be offset 
significantly by the indirect effects of military expenditures in reducing 
private savings and investment, which will in turn hurt longer run increases 
in productivity and growth (Deger and Sen, 1983 ). 
Therefore both the direct and indirect effects of these expenditures 
must be considered in a net assessment of their economic impact. At the risk 
of over simplification, there are four main perspectives to this assessment 
(Chan, 1985, p. 415). The first, the "modernization" model, is most closely 
associated with Benoit (1973, 1978). Benoit acknowledged that military 
expenditures can have several unfavorable consequences: 
l. Income shift (increased military spending necessarily reduces the 
civilian domestic product); 
2. Military productivity effect (compared with the civilian sector, the 
government sector is characterized by slower productivity increases); and 
3. Investment effect (military spending crowds out civilian in-
vestment). 
However, given his finding of a positive relationship between the 
defense burden and economic growth in the third world, Benoit stressed 
some compensating favorable factors: 
l. The military helps to introduce modern skills and attitudes; 
2. The military's capital expenditures (e.g., roads, bridges, airports) 
have alternative civilian uses and help to strengthen a country's economic 
infrastructure; and 
3. Defense spending leads to mild inflation which in turn, encour-
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ages fuller utilization of production facilities. In Benoit's view, these indirect 
positive effects of defense spending outweigh its direct or indirect negative 
effects on economic growth. 
Part of the problem in applying a post-keynesian approach to third 
world defense issues stems from the fact that developing countries are far 
from homogeneous. One would expect the impact of increased defense 
expenditures on the Brazilian economy to vary somewhat from that experi-
enced in Chad. Similarly, countries with an indigenous arms industry (Loo-
ney, 1988, ch. 4) should experience ceteris paribus different defense/in-
come multipliers than those found in non producing nations (where ceteris 
paribus a larger proportion of increased military expenditures is likely to 
wind up in imported weapons). 
How governments allocate expenditures can have a significant impact 
on the relative incomes of the middle- and high-income groups. A major 
middle-income group is made up of professionals and administrators employ-
ed by the public sector. By raising the salaries of these emplyees, the 
government can easily improve the position of the middle class. On the 
other hand, an increase in purchases of military hardware would increase 
the relative incomes of influential middlemen and contractors. 
A recent study of Saudi Arabian public sector expenditures illustrates 
this phenomenon. Here Kavoussi (1983, pp. 75-76) notes that in the after-
math of the oil price increases of 1973, government expenditure clearly 
shifted from wage and salary p~yments to purchases of military goods and 
investment in machinery and construction. By 1979, the share of wages and 
salaries in total government expenditure had been reduced to one half of the 
197 3 level. In contrast, during the same period, the share of investment 
increased twenty percentage points to about one-half of all public sector 
outlays. Immediately after the oil price increase, the proportion of gov-
ernment expenditure spent on military purchases increased from 25 to 35 
percent and remained at that level until 1977. The slowdown in the growth 
of military expenditures in 1978 caused a larger increase in the share of 
investment than in the share of wages and salaries. 
Due to the lack of reliable data on income distribution, we assume 
below that changes in the share of consumption in GDP are reflective 
of income distributional changes. That is, since the lower income groups 
consume a large portion of their incomes, a reduction in the share of private 
consumption in gross domestic production indicates a deterioration in the 
distribution of income. 
In short, if the post-keynesian approach toward third world military 
expenditures is correct, we should expect significantly different patterns of 
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growth and distribution associated with military expenditures in arms produc-
ing and non producing countries. 
Impact of Military Expenditures on Consumption and Investment 
Without excess capacity, increased military expenditures will either 
reduce civilian consumption or else capital formation and thus growth. A 
priori the impact of the military burden on private consumption after con-
trolling for savings, government revenues and the resource balance, could 
either be positive or negative. However, taxes and savings should reduce the 
share of private consumption in GDP, with larger deficits in the balance of 
payments facilitating increases in the share of consumption in GDP: 
PRB =/[AS(-), RBB (-), RTCRYB (-), MEP(?)]. 
Where: 
PRB = the average share of private consumption in GDP, 1970-82 
AS = average savings rate, 1970-82 
RBB = the average resource balance as a % of GDP, 1970-82 
RTCRYB = average government revenues as a % of GDP, 1970-82 
GETYB = average government expenditures as a % of GDP, 1970-82 
MEP = average per capita military expenditures, 1970-82 
For the non-Producers: 
(1) PRB = - 0.49 AS - 0.33 RBB - 0.41 RTCRYB + 0.56 MEP 
(- 2.44) (- 3.27) (- 2.58) (3.47) 
df = 30; r2 = 0.751; F = 19.04 
For the Producers: 
(2) PRB = - 0.77 AS - ·o.18 RBB - 0.03 RTCRYB- 0.75 MEP 
(- 5.38) (- 1.46) (- 1.02) (- 5.26) 
• 
df = 17; r2 = 0.768; F = 18.48 
An interesting pattern therefore exists whereby the military burden 
appears to be associated with higher consumption in the non arms produc-
"· ,.--·_._,~,:.¥ . .. -/' 
. . :.~1~·;~~,_.,.,> ~~. ~-~~"•p•·> 
---~,':":·~·-;;; ._,<·:·: 
•:/ ,.,. · .
'°'''" *;;,.,.:,;t __ 'n.,;~ 
t 
l 
THIRD WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES 785 
ing countries. In sharp contrast, increases in the military burden appear to 
come at the expense of consumption in the arms producing nations. 
In contrast, the impact of the military burden on the share of in-
vestment in GDP (GDIB) is reversed, i.e., the military burden is associated 
with increased levels of investment in the arms producing countries and 
decreased levels of investment in the non-producing countries. More speci-
fically: 
Non-Producers: 
(3) GDIB = 0.88 AS - 0.61 RBB + 0.48 GETYB - 0.41 MEP 
(6.47) (- 4.57) (4.31) (- 3.59) 
df = 293; r2 = 0.775; F = 20.08 
Producers: 
(4) GDIB = 0.98 AS - 0.74 RBB- 0.48 GETYB + 0.55 MEP 
(6.05) (- 4.34) (- 1.35) (2.86) 
df = 17; r2 = 0.762; F = 10.41 
Where: 
GDIB = the average share of investment in GDP, 1970-1982 
GETYB = the share of government expenditure in GDP, 1970-82 
How can these differential impacts of the defense burden - increased 
investment and reduced consumption - associated with increased defense 
burdens in the arms producing countries and vice versa for non-producers, 
be explained? 
Interestingly enough, these results are consistent with those likely to 
be found as a result of economic disarticulation (Taylor and Bacha, 1976). 
Particularly in the case of semi-industrialized LDCs, there is likely to be a 
group of dynamic leading industries specializing in production of automo-
biles, machinery, consume durables and military equipment. Higher arms 
spending selectively stimulates demand for products from precisely these 
sectors. 
The resulting output increases require employment of relatively skilled 
and managerial workers at high incomes; their "modern" tastes as consum-
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ers causes a second round of leading sector demand. If extra demand were 
met by diversion of capacity from industries producing commodities favored 
by less skilled workers and the poor, then the stage would be set for a 
growth process supported by a squeeze on wage goods. Investment would 
be stimulated by the increase in output in leading sectors, adding still more 
demand pressure. There would be additional generation of high income 
consumer purchases and so on. 
The whole process operates under a resource constraint, but it is 
evaded by diversion of capacity from sectors producing wage goods in the 
process; only the poor lose by slow growth of production in commodities 
suited to their needs (Taylor 1981, p. 4). 
The net effect might also be to lower the overall output to capital 
ratio, as observed above for the arms producers, because wage goods tend 
to be more labor intensive than arms production or consumer durables. 
This sort of mechanism can support faster growth when there are 
significant differences in consumption patterns between poor and rich, for 
example, in demands for food and consumer durables. 
The net effect in the arms producing countries would be a more likely 
increase (than in the case of non-producers) in investment (due to direct 
linkages) and declines in overall private consumption (since lower income 
groups consume a higher proportion of their incomes) associated with in-
creases in the military burden. While the same investment and consumption 
could conceivably occur in the arms producing countries, the likelihood is 
that there would be much less. In fact, these countries might experience a 
more direct positive relationship between added personnel and consumption 
with increased military burdens and reduced levels of investment due to 
few direct linkages associated with an increased military burden. 
These are precisely the patterns for arms and non-arms producers 
identified by the empirical analysis above. 
Inflationary Impacts of Defense E~penditures 
It is possible that the linkages between the defense burden and 
consumption observed for the arms producing countries could, instead of 
the mechanisms outlined above, he caused by inflation and the resulting 
forced savings impact on private consumption (together with a stimulating 
impact on overall investment). 
According to this line of reasoning, one might also expect the inflation-
ary impact of increased defense expenditures to be greater for the arms 
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producers (due to capacity constraints and policies of domestic absorption). 
Non-arms producers could, in part, meet added military burdens through 
constant price imports. 
In fact, a number of writers have argued that defense spending raises 
demand without increasing supply, and, therefore, that it does not contri-
bute to current or future standards of living. Moreover, because more of this 
spending goes to the procurement of capital goods than do other forms of 
government spending, it is more inflationary. It is also less resistant to 
prices and wage increases as military procurement from domestic suppliers 
is often negotiated on a cost-plus basis. Thus, defense spending may be 
disproportionately a cause of cost push inflation. 
Finally, because officials are usually reluctant either to raise taxes or to 
cut back other spending to finance additional defense expenditures, their 
resort to budget deficits and public debt tends to generate further inflationar-
y pressure (Chan, 1985, p. 418). 
According to this line of reasoning, the inflationary impacts of in-
creased military budgets might be expected to be higher in the arms produ-
cing countries. 
To test for the inflationary impact of increased defense burdens, a 
simple model was developed whereby inflation between 1970 and 1982 
(INFB) was postulated to be influenced positively by: 
1. inflation in the 1960-70 period (INFA) - to control for chance 
high or low inflation countries 
2. the average per capita military expenditure (MEP), 1970-82; and 
3. the average share of public consumption (PCB) in GDP 1970-82 
(PCB). 
Public consumption was introduced to correct for any biases that might 
occur from a high correlation between overall public sector consumption 
and the military burden, i.e., the higher the share of public consumption in 
GDP ceteris paribus the greater the aggregate consumption demand and the 
fewer the private sector consumer goods available to meet that demand. 
The results were as follows: 
Producing Countries: 
(5) INFB = 0.62 PCB + 0.80 INFA - 2.19 MEP 
(3.09) (7.71) (- 2.19) 
df = 17; r2 = 0.854; F = 27.49 
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Non-Producing Countries: 
(6) INFB = 0.21 PCB + 0.76 INFA + 0.02 MEP 
(- 2.14) (7.79) (0.24) 
df = 28; r2 = 0.614; F = 12.36 
The negative impact of the military burden in the producing countries 
clearly invalidates the forced savings explanation of falling private consump-
tion and increased investment found with increased military burdens. The 
income distributional demand profile alteration and resource shift mecha-
nism outlined above (in the discussion of private consumptfon) tends to be 
supported, or at least not invalidated, by the observed patterns of military 
burden and inflation. 
With regard to the impact on growth of defense expenditures, while 
Benoit's ~uggestion that defense spending could encourage fuller utilization 
of the existing productive facilities may be particularly relevant for the 
defense producers, it has much less relevance for the non-producers. The 
latter countries are likely to be more constrained by supply. The supposed 
benefits of defense spending may simply impose additional burdens on the 
economy through expanded salaries, etc., producing excess demand for 
goods and services in general. The net result might well be slower, rather 
than faster, economic growth. 
Impact of Military Expenditures on Productivity 
A more subtle effect military expenditures may have on the economies 
of developing countries may be through the impact of military expenditure 
on absorptive capacity. If cooperating factors, such as technical personnel, 
infrastructure, vital intermediate imports, craft skills, and so forth are di-
verted to the military as a consequence of defense spending, then the produc-
tivity (or rate of return) of investment will drop. The result will be a 
reduction in the demand for new productive capital formation and a deceler-
ation in overall economic growth. 
On the other hand the counter argument would claim that defense 
expenditure has a high productivity enhancement effect, since it contributes 
to skill formation, technical and vocational training, and the creation of 
new infrastructure (Deger and Sen, 1983, p. 50). In like fashion, skills 
imparted by military education and drill (knowing how to drive, functional 
numeracy and literacy, craft skills, etc.) remain with trainees for life. If 
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soldiers are mostly conscripts, they may rapidly carry their acquired learning 
back to productive use in civilian life. 
Regardless of which mechanism predominates, the net impact of in-
creased military burden on the productivity of capital should manifest itself 
in changes in the output capital ratio (ICOR) (here defined as the growth in 
real GDP 1970-82 divided by the growth in domestic capital formation 
over the same period). 
If the net effect of an increase in the military burden is to reduce the 
productivity of capital (and presumably its rate of return), increased defense 
expenditures should have a negative sign when regressed on ICOR. Several 
other factors could, however, simultaneously reduce overall productivity 
and must therefore be controlled for. 
These include: 
1. The growth in public sector consumption (PCGB) i.e., an expan-
sion in "unproductive" public sector consumption might divert resources 
from production capital formation. 
2. Inflation (INFB) might also reduce capital productivity and/or 
absorption through diversion of investment towards more speculative ac-
tivity. 
The model used to test for the possible effects of military expenditures 
was therefore specified as: 
ICOR = f[PCGB (-), INFB (-), MEP (-)] 
where: 
PCGB = the growth in real public consumption, 1970-82 
INFB = the rate of inflation, 1970-82 
MEP = the average military expenditure per capita, 1970-82. 
The results: 
Producing Countries: 
(7) ICOR = - 0.14 PCGB + 0.42 INFB - 0.87 MEP 
(- 0.98) (3.06) (- 7.16) 
df = 18; r2 = 0.808; F = 21.16 
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Non-Producing Countries: 
(8) ICOR = 0.21 PCGB- 0.22 INFB - 0.12 MEP 
(1.24) (- 1.40) (- 0.75) 
df = 38; r2 = 0.114; F = 1.51 
The results for the arms producers indicate that increased military 
burdens have a highly significant and negative impact on the productivity 
of investment. The non-arms producers, in sharp contrast do not experience 
any statistically significant impacts of military expenditure on investment 
productivity. 
In sum, the empirical results tend to confirm one of the hypotheses 
outlined earlier: increased military expenditures in countries with an indige-
nous arms industry may result in that industry (due to government priorities 
on defense and defense related activities) pre-empting scarce managerial, 
scientific and technical inputs from the private sector. The net result being 
one of reducing the rate of return (as proxied by the incremental capital 
output ratio) on investment. 
Determinants of Military Expenditures 
Traditionally, the bulk of the literature (Maizels and Nissanke, 1987) 
on third world military expenditure has stressed external or strategic-politi-
cal variables as critical in affecting allocations to defense. Recent research 
(Looney, 1988; Looney and Frederiksen, 1988) however, indicates that 
overall expenditure constraints may ultimately set the actual range in which 
military expenditures are likely to fall. 
In terms of the producers and non-producers, the results of a small 
model linking arms production, resource constraints, military expenditures 
and arms imports (Looney, 1989a), demonstrated that a high proportion of 
the various measures of resources allocated to the military in arms produc-
ing countries can be accounted for by internal (economic) factors. On the 
other hand, non-producer environments were found to be relatively more 
susceptible to external factors. Apparently, the possession of an indigenous 
arms industry results in ongoing •demands to maintain relatively high (and 
stable) levels of defense expenditures. 
Extending these findings, the general form of the military expenditure 
relationship was specified as: 
MEP = f[GNPPER ( + ), GDB (?),PCB ( +)] 
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Where: 
MEP = the average level of per capita military expenditures, 1970-82 
GNPPER = the average per capita income, 1970-82 
GDB = the average share of government borrowing in GDP, 1970-82 




(10) MEP = 0.21 GNPPER + 0.29 GDB + 0.43 PCB 
(2.22) (- 3.37) (2.94) 
r2 = 0.921; F = 142.18 
Non-Producers: 
(11) MEP = 0.59 GNPPER- 0.46 GDB + 0.09 PCB 
(4.73) . (- 5.82) (0.87) 
r2 = 0.892; F = 122.36 
Apparently the governments of non-producing countries may not face 
the same political pressures to maintain high levels of defense expenditures 
during periods of low external threat simply to maintain employment in 
defense plants. In these countries, there is not a strong link between militar-
y expenditures and government borrowing. Nor is there a close relationship 
between military espenditures and the share of resources accounted for by 
government consumption. 
f.or the arms producers, hardly any output from defense plants is 
absorbed by external markets. This places great pressure on internal sales to 
sustain efficient levels of production. Arms producers appear to respond to 
this need by resorting to borrowing to sustain defense expenditures. In 
addition the close link between military expenditures and the share of 
government consumption in GDP suggests some sort of "Military Keynesian-
ism" based on stimulating demand in defense plants during deflationary 
periods (Looney, 1989b; Looney and Frederiksen, 1987; and Looney 
1989c). 
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In addition, the producing countries appear to finance a large part of 
their military expenditures with external debt and therefore are not necessari-
ly shifting domestic resources away from productive activities to produce 
arms. Tighter controls on foreign lending to these countries would undoubt-
edly make arms production somewhat less attractive. 
The Impact of Military Expenditures on Overall Growth 
The analysis in the previous sections suggested several mechanisms 
through which increased military burdens may, depending on whether or 
not the country is an arms producer, impact on the growth process. As 
shown above, arms producers are characterized by a shift in income from 
households to the public sector associated with increases in the military 
burden. While this shift does not appear to be inflationary in and of itself, 
there is reason to believe the net impact on income distribution may be 
regressive. In sharp contrast, non-arms producers appear to shift resources 
toward the private sector (in the form of increased consumption) as the 
military burden increases. 
A priori one can argue that the net impact of these income distributio-
nal shifts might be one of increased or decreased growth. A logical case could 
also be that, given the many other factors impinging on third world growth 
rates, the overall impact of focreased military burdens is likely to be rather 
insignificant. 
Operationally, the role of the military burden (MEP) in effecting over-
all growth in third world countries was examined by determining its impact 
on the margin after other growth inducing and inhibiting factors had been 
accounted for (Looney and Frederiksen, 1986): 
GDPGB = f[GDIGB ( + ), INFB (-), RBB ( + ), MEP (?)] 
Where: 
GDPGB = average rate of growth of real GDP, 1970-82 
GDIGB = the growth in investment, 1970-82 
INFB = the rate of inflation, 1970-82 
RBB = the average resource .balance as a % of GDP, 1970-82 
MEP = the average share of military expenditures in GNP, 1970-82 
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The results: 
Arms Producing Countries: 
(9) GDPGB = 0.74 GDIGB - 0.29 INFB + 0.40 RBB + 0.35 MEP 
(3.80) (- 1.62) (2.62) (2.09) 
df = 19; r2 = 0.736; F = 10.50 
Non-Producing Countries: 
(10) GDPGB = 0.92 GDIGB - 0.15 INFB + 0.05 RBB- 0.59 MEP 
(7.24) (- 1.87) (0.52) (- 4.23) 
df = 45; r2 = 0.639; F = 19 .. 27 
Again a contrasting pattern appears whereby the military burden 
tends to inhibit growth in the non-producing countries and stimulate it in 
the arms producing countries. 
Conclusions 
Benoit's work on the impact of military expenditures has attracted 
considerable attention over the past twenty years for at least three reasons: 
1. His analytical reasoning is persuasive in the sense that there is 
good economic logic behind the claim that defense expenditures can, at least 
in the short run, increase overall growth. 
2. He produced economic evidence in support of his claim as to the 
macroeconomic impact of defense expenditures. 
3. His analysis shows that the transmission mechanisms of defense 
efforts to the rest of the economy may be substantially different in develop-
ing countries from those in the advanced industrial economies. 
The present study has shown that a post-keynesian approach to the 
defense growth debate provides a usi!ful framework for interactions be-
tween defense spending, the distribution of income, investment and overall 
economic growth. The analysis above provides some additional insights into 
the dynamics affecting the ultimate impact of defense expenditures on 
overall economic growth. 
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Specifically it appears that the macro-linkages from the arms industry 
to the economy enable third world arms producers to minimize the adverse 
impacts on the economy often associated with increased military burdens. 
The mechanism through which this process occurs, however, appears to 
worsen the overall income distribution through the shifting of resources 
from wage goods to investment. More fundamentally the lowering of over-
all productivity of investment stemming from increased military expendi-
tures is likely to take a long run toll on growth through reducing the amount 
of investment flowing into productive capital formation. 
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ANALISI POST-KEYNESIANA DELLE SPESE MILITARI DEL TERZO 
MONDO 
Scopo di questo articolo e di riunire vari elementi degli approcci classico, 
keynesiano e marxista all'analisi delle spese militari del Terzo Mondo. Sulla base 
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di questa sintesi risulta che un approccio post-keynesiano al dibattito sull'aumen-
to della difesa fornisce un utile schema per le interazioni fra spese di difesa, 
distribuzione del reddito, investimento e crescita economica generale. Inoltre, 
questo schema fornisce ulteriori intuiziqni sulla dinamica di cio che determina in 
definitiva l'impatto delle spese per la difesa sulla crescita economica globale. 
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